Military! - Dots Now Connected
CDC WEEKLY INFLUENZA SUMMARY UPDATE
Flu
shot, anyone?
Gotten your flu shot yet? Whether you have or not, one leading
congressman's warning might frighten you more than the needle.
If your doctor hasn't told you, Rep. Dan Burton, Indiana Republican, feels
it is his duty to inform Americans about the "contents" of their influenza
vaccines.
"As we approach the flu season, many of you will visit the doctor's office
and receive an annual influenza vaccine. This might prevent the flu, but
what else will it do?" Mr. Burton said. "You should be aware that the
vaccine you are about to receive contains thimerosal — a mercury-laden
preservative."
Mr. Burton says scientific evidence "continues to accumulate" regarding a
biologically plausible connection between the preservative and certain
neurological disorders. Some scientists have attributed the growth in
Alzheimer's disease and autism to mercury found in certain vaccines.
During his chairmanship of the Government Reform Committee, Mr. Burton
held numerous hearings on possible adverse effects of thimerosal.
"You take the blue pill and the story ends. You wake in your bed and you believe whatever you want to believe."
"You take the red pill and
you stay in Wonderland and I'll show you how deep the
rabbit-hole goes."
Researcher Who Got SARS In Own Lab Is MILITARY
From Patricia Doyle, PhD
12-18-3
The SARS research ongoing was for the MILITARY.
This is yet, more proof that SARS originated in the military lab and
is still being studied by military around the world.
The Promed article below makes a point of stating that the 44 year old
researcher was military.
....and so, the Dots...they DO Connect!
SARS - WORLDWIDE (188): TAIWAN, SARS QUARANTINE BREACH
A ProMED-mail post
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
http://www.isid.org
[1]
Date: Thu 18 Dec 2003
From: Stephen S. Morse <ssm20@columbia.edu>
Source: Associated Press Report, Thu 18 Dec 2003 [edted]
Breach of quarantine by SARS virus research worker
--------------------------------------------------
Taiwan's 1st SARS patient in 5 months didn't strictly quarantine
himself at home as officials originally said he did, and 2 colleagues
who had close contact with him have flown to America, officials said
on Thu 18 Dec 2003. These developments raised more serious questions
about decisions made by the patient, a 44 year old military scientist
who officials say might have caught SARS while mishandling virus
samples in his lab. Officials also have said he allegedly wasn't
wearing safety gear, like a gown and gloves. Although the researcher
suspected that he might have been exposed to the highly contagious
virus, he kept his plans to go to Singapore on 7 Dec 2003 to attend a
conference, officials said.
Singapore already has quarantined 70 people who had contact with the
man. Taiwanese officials have issued quarantine orders for 25 people,
including 3 Americans, one Japanese, and a Singaporean who flew with
the scientist when he returned from Singapore on 10 Dec 2003.
Officials said they were searching for the foreigners. So far, none of
the quarantined has developed SARS symptoms, and officials have said
the man was asymptomatic during his travels and probably didn't infect
anyone.
When the patient tested positive for SARS on Wednesday, officials said
that he had quarantined himself at home since developing a fever upon
his return on 10 Dec 2003. But on Thu 18 Dec 2003, Shih Wen-yi, a
spokesman for Taiwan's Center for Disease Control, told reporters that
the man didn't stay at home the entire time. Shih said that the
scientist spent the night at his work dormitory on 10 Dec 2003. The
next day, his wife drove the researcher -- who wore a surgical mask --
to a suburban Taipei medical clinic, he said. After his check-up, the
scientist went back home and waited 5 days before he went to a
hospital, Shih said. This was a violation of guidelines that require
SARS researchers to seek immediate hospital care, he said.
"Maybe our awareness campaign was not enough," said Shih, who declined
to discuss possible disciplinary action. The clinic's receptionist and
doctor have been quarantined along with 5 people related to the
clinic's staff, Shih said. "There were no other patients in the clinic
at the time," Shih said. The CDC official also said that 2 colleagues
who went to Singapore with the researcher traveled to the United
States on 10 Dec 2003, the same day they returned to Taiwan. The
colleagues, who worked for the Ministry of Defense, have been ordered
to return to Taiwan on Sunday, said Shih, who wouldn't say where the
men were in America. The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
was monitoring the men, who have shown no SARS symptoms, he said.
As Taiwanese recovered from the initial scare of the possible return
of SARS, the focus turned to the scientist's mistakes. Officials have
said that he might have been infected by spilled virus samples while
rushing to clean his laboratory. Shih declined to discuss the lab
conditions and a claim by the World Health Organization that the
researcher wasn't wearing protective gear. An investigative report
would be released in 3 days, he said.
Defense Minister Tang Yiau-ming defended the researcher, who was
testing how SARS responds to different medicines. Tang said that the
researcher had his wife, 2 adult daughters, and father stay in
separate homes after he got sick. "Because he performed this dangerous
work, he understands its danger, so he exerted the utmost effort to
prevent (mistakes)," Tang said. But Tang acknowledged that mistakes
were made.
[byline: Stephan Grauwels]
--
Stephen S. Morse
<ssm20@columbia.edu>
[This report discloses gross negligence and irresponsibility in the
handling of SARS virus in a laboratory situation, in clear breach of
the regulations recommended by the WHO SARS Laboratory Workshop, 22
Oct 2003 (see: <http://www.who.int/csr/sars/guidelines/en/SARSLabmeeting.pdf>)
These recommendations state the following:
"(iv) Biosafety in the laboratory, and inventory of SARS CoV cultures
------------------------------------------------
The importance of laboratory biosafety was clearly demonstrated with
the occurrence of a laboratory-acquired case of SARS CoV infection in
Singapore last month. The participants discussed a number of biosafety
issues, including the biocontainment level for culturing SARS CoV and
working with live SARS CoV, the biocontainment level under which SARS
CoV cultures and clinical specimens were stored, and the need to have
national inventories of SARS CoV and some form of national
certification of labs working with SARS CoV.
The recommendations are: 1. To endorse the WHO biosafety guidelines
for handling of SARS specimens which states that SARS CoV should be
cultured under biocontainment level 3, and that diagnostic activities
which do not involve culturing the virus should be undertaken at a
minimum of biocontainment level 2 using level 3 work practices. 2.
That cultures of SARS CoV should be stored at a minimum of
biocontainment level 3, and that clinical specimens known to contain
SARS CoV be preferably stored at a similar level, but if not possible,
that they and clinical specimens suspected of containing SARS CoV be
stored at a minimum of biocontainment level 2 within a secure (locked)
environment. 3. That national governments maintain an inventory of
laboratories working with and/or storing live cultures of SARS CoV,
and that the inventory should include clinical specimens known to
contain SARS CoV. 4. That while not wishing to restrict the research
and diagnosis of SARS CoV, that national governments institute a
process by which laboratories wishing to work with SARS CoV be
licensed to do so."
The information that follows is taken from the current issue (18 Dec
2003) of the New England Journal of Medicine and relates to assessment
of risk of SARS transmission during air travel. This article concludes
that: "Transmission of SARS may occur on an aircraft when infected
persons fly during the symptomatic phase of illness. Measures to
reduce the risk of transmission are warranted". Fortunately, the
Taiwanese SARS virus-infected research worker described above is
reported to have been asymptomatic during his air travel to and from
Singapore and the risk of transmission of SARS to other passengers is
slight. - Mod.CP]
******
[2]
Date: Thu 18 Dec 2003
From: Badri Badrinath <badrishanthi@hotmail.com>
Source: N Engl J Med 2003; 349: 2416-22. 18 Dec [edited]
<http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/short/349/25/2416>
SARS transmission in aircraft
-----------------------------
(From : Oslen SJ, et al. Transmission of the severe acute respiratory
syndrome on aircraft. N Engl J Med 2003; 349: 2416-22)
The severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) spread rapidly around the
world, largely because persons infected with the SARS-associated
coronavirus (SARS-CoV) traveled on aircraft to distant cities.
Although many infected persons traveled on commercial aircraft, the
risk, if any, of in-flight transmission is unknown.
We attempted to interview passengers and crew members at least 10 days
after they had taken one of 3 flights that transported a patient or
patients with SARS. All index patients met the criteria of the World
Health Organization for a probable case of SARS, and index or
secondary cases were confirmed to be positive for SARS-CoV on
reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain reaction or serologic testing.
After one flight carrying a symptomatic person and 119 other persons,
laboratory-confirmed SARS developed in 16 persons, 2 others were given
diagnoses of probable SARS, and 4 were reported to have SARS but could
not be interviewed. Among the 22 persons with illness, the mean time
from the flight to the onset of symptoms was 4 days (range, 2-8), and
there were no recognized exposures to patients with SARS before or
after the flight. Illness in passengers was related to the physical
proximity to the index patient, with illness reported in 8 of the 23
persons who were seated in the 3 rows in front of the index patient,
as compared with 10 of the 88 persons who were seated elsewhere
(relative risk, 3.1; 95 percent confidence interval, 1.4 to 6.9). In
contrast, another flight carrying four symptomatic persons resulted in
transmission to at most one other person, and no illness was
documented in passengers on the flight that carried a person who had
presymptomatic SARS.
Transmission of SARS may occur on an aircraft when infected persons
fly during the symptomatic phase of illness. Measures to reduce the
risk of transmission are warranted.
Dr P Badrinath MD, PhD
Specialist Registrar in Public Health,
Southend-on-Sea PCT
Recognised Clinical Teacher,
University of Cambridge, UK
<badrishanthi@hotmail.com>
Patricia A. Doyle, PhD
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Zhan le Devlesa tai sastimasa
Go with God and in Good Health